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Abstract 
This study is on the role of bank capital on bank lending behavior and other macroeconomic 
variables. This study examined empirically Basel I Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2), Basel II Capital 
(Total capital requirement), Basel III Capital (Conservation Buffer (CSB) + Counter-Cyclical 
Buffer (CCB)) and lending behavior of banking institutions in Nigeria. This study is time series in 
nature and data relating to the study were obtained from Nigerian stock exchange fact sheet and 
CBN statistical bulletin for the period 1986 through 2019. The analyses of the data were done 
using descriptive statistical tools and econometric technique of Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ardl), and granger causality test. The results indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between Basel capital and lending behavior of banking institutions in Nigeria. Also 
the results show that there is a bi-directional causality between Basel capital and lending behavior 
in Nigeria. As such we conclude that Basel capital influences growth in credit to the private sector 
(CPS) and growth in credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria. 
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Contribution of this paper to the literature 
This study contributes to existing literature by examining empirically Basel I Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2), 
Basel II Capital (Total capital requirement), Basel III Capital (Conservation Buffer (CSB) + Counter-
Cyclical Buffer (CCB)) and lending behavior of banking institutions in Nigeria. 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been the debate in literature with respect to the role of bank capital on bank lending behavior. The 
traditional monetary school believes that bank reserves play critical role in determining the volume of bank lending 
in particular while the bank lending channel thesis maintain that monetary policy actions can largely alter the 
supply of bank loans by changing bank reserves. According to Diamond and Rajan (2000) higher capital 
requirement reduces liquidity creation but enables the bank to avoid financial distress and survive more often. 
Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2010) suggest that better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions 
arising from lending and perform well. The study of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) stated that capital 
regulations do not necessarily exert positive impact on banking system stability. Conversely, Modigliani-Miller 
theorem argues that given the perfect capital market where there is the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, the 
capital structure of the firm does not matter in deciding the value of the firm. This thought, in banking context, 
opines that a bank‟s lending decision is irrelevant to its financial structure if there is a perfect capital market. When 
a banker does not face any difficulty in lending owing  to the presence of the perfect capital market, neither the 
lending channel nor the capital channel are relevant for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Bernanke 
& Blinder, 1988). The general understanding is that banks with sound financial health possess higher level of 
capital and could contribute meaningfully to the financial intermediation. 
In the light of the above, several studies in developed economies have established that there is a link between 
bank capital and bank lending, such that bank capital acts as an automatic amplifier for macroeconomic activities. 
This amplification of the economy works through the mechanism of the bank capital channel (Albertazzi & 
Marchetti, 2010; Blum & Hellwig, 1995; Blum., 1999; Brun, Fraisse, & Thesmar, 2013; Buch & Prieto, 2014; Kapan 
& Minoiu, 2013; Van den Heuvel, 2007; Woo, 2003). This is why Van den Heuvel (2007) stated that insufficient 
bank capital shows how monetary policy affects bank lending behavior. Lending by banks with low capital has a 
delayed and then amplified reaction to interest rate shocks, relative to well capitalized banks. However, a cursory 
look at the Nigerian economy shows that not much study has been done to empirically investigate the effects of 
Basel capital channel on bank lending behavior in considering the uncertain nature of the macroeconomic and 
financial environment occasioned by macroeconomic fluctuations, incessant bank failure and inability of bank 
capital to absorb emerging shocks. Hence the research gap this study seeks to fill. 
 
2. Theoretical Thoughts and Empirical Review 
2.1. Theory of Bank Capital Channel 
This theory postulate that monetary policy actions influence bank lending behavior, through its impact on 
bank equity capital. These monetary policy actions can lead to a change in the financial position of the banking 
sector, thereby changing the preferences of its shareholder (Markovic, 2006). When bank equity capital is 
sufficiently low, because of loan losses or some other adverse shocks, the bank will reduce lending because of the 
capital requirement and the cost of issuing new equity. Even when the capital requirement is not currently binding, 
the model shows that a low capitalized bank may optimally forgo profitable lending opportunities now to lower the 
risk of future capital inadequacy. Furthermore, the theory reports that there exist at least two distinct ways in 
which the level of bank capital may alter the impact of monetary shocks on bank lending and these are through the 
traditional bank lending channel and the direct mechanism that is known as bank capital channel. 
 
2.2. Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theory 
Modigliani-Miller argued that in the world of perfect capital markets, bank lending decisions are independent 
of banks‟ capital structure, since the bank will always be able to find investors willing to fund viable lending 
opportunities; the level of bank capital is irrelevant to lending and also to the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2006). This theory or logic of Modigliani and Miller existed as bank‟s 
lending depended on its capital structure as well as on lending opportunities and market interest rates. When 
equity is sufficiently low, because of loan losses or some other adverse shock, the bank will reduce lending because 
the capital requirement is not currently binding.  The model shows that a low capitalized bank may optimally forgo 
profitable lending opportunities now to lower the risk of future capital inadequacy (Chami & Cosimano, 2001; Meh 
& Moran, 2010). Another important attribute of the model is the maturity transformation performed by banks, 
exposing them to interest rate risk. The result of this is a monetary tightening, by increasing the short term 
interest rate, lowers bank profits. Unless the bank can decrease dividends substantially, this will resist over time or 
cover bank capital given the failure of the Modigliani and Miller logic for less lending. Thus monetary policy 
affects the supply of bank loans through its effect on bank equity. This dynamic effect of the bank capital channel-
amplifies the standard interest rate channel of monetary policy. 
 
2.3. Capital Regulation and Risk taking Behavior of Banks in Nigeria 
Several scholars have documented that the function of bank capital is to reduce bank risk (Adewumi, 1997; 
Altman, Bharath, & Saunders, 2002; Berger, Herring, & Szegö, 1995; Koch & MacDonald, 2015; Peek & Rosengren, 
1995).  A bank that is adequately capitalized can reduce bank risk in the following ways: 
i. By providing a cushion to absorb bank losses. In this regard, losses occasioned by bad loans, poor securities 
investment, criminal and management misjudgment are cushioned which allows the banks to continue in 
its operations and in the process the said losses are either corrected or recovered. The bank‟s capital is said 
to be the last resort against failures. 
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ii. By building depositors and general public confidence on the banks institutions and creditors reassurance by 
adequate capital (Adewumi, 1997). 
iii. Adequate capital serves as a regulator of bank‟s growth. Peek. and Rosengren (1995) found that hundreds 
of smaller banks with weak capital base went under through mergers because of burgeoning growth in 
large business loans, which could only be made by banks with stronger or adequate capital base.  
iv. The Nigerian banking laws however stipulates that the maximum loan that can be given to a single 
borrower must not be more than 20% of the shareholders‟ fund unimpaired by losses. Also banks that fail to 
maintain the required minimum capital ratios are prohibited from advertising for or accepting new 
deposits, granting of credit, making investment and paying cash dividend to shareholders.  
Furthermore, it is expedient to state that the bank capital channel plays a critical role in its lending behavior. 
Banks with higher level of capital are in a better position to absorb shock, losses and repay deposit in a timely 
manner (Bhatta, 2015). Admati et al. (2010) asserted that the role of bank equity became highly recognized after 
the 2008 financial crises. The crises have apparently strengthened the fact that highly leveraged banks do not 
create negative externalities. The works of  Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Woo (2003) based in Japan 
investigated whether negative shocks to capital induced in the above countries banks restricts lending. The studies 
provided evidence that negative shocks to bank capital leads to significant decline in lending.  Similarly, there has 
been a debate in literature as to whether stifling of bank capital would lead to a contraction of bank loans supply 
during recession. It was found that during recession, bank loans supply was contracted due to stifling of capital. 
Using different methodologies, various scholars have shown that loan growth at individual banks were positively 
related to the initial capital ratio (Bernanke. & Lown, 1991). Furthermore they argued that capital unconstrained 
banks could react to negative shocks to capital by increasing deposit taking. When banks are not capital 
constrained there is an expectation of negative linkage between shocks to capital and deposit taking. On the 
contrary they document a positive link between shocks to capital and the dynamics of deposit. Berger. and Udell 
(1994) concluded that expansion of loan was lower for less capitalized banks but do not detect the sensitivity of 
loan expansion to capital ratio during recession and favors the hypothesis that capital crunch adversely affects 
loans expansion during the 1990s. 
 
2.4. Empirical Evidence 
It has been well documented that undercapitalized banks reduce their lending more than well-capitalized ones. 
Using cross-sectional bank level data, Bernanke. and Lown (1991) showed that loan growth between the second 
quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 was positively correlated with banks‟ capital ratios at the beginning of 
the period. Berger. and Udell (1994) argue that higher capital requirements encouraged banks to reduce lending to 
the most risky categories of borrowers. They showed that US banks reduced their commercial loans and increased 
their holdings of Treasuries in the early 1990s. However, the reduction in borrowers‟ risk profile can increase 
banks‟ financial soundness. Small businesses heavily depend on banks for credit, since it may be difficult for them to 
find alternative sources of funding (Brewer, Genay, Jackson, & Worthington, 1996; Cole, Wolken, & Woodburn, 
1996). 
Lower lending to these borrowers can slow down economic growth as shown by Hancock and Wilcox (1998) in 
their study on U.S. for the 1989-1992 periods. Peek and Rosengren (2000) considered the Japanese banking crisis 
as an exogenous loan supply shock and found that it is linked to construction activity in U.S. commercial real estate 
markets, thereby affecting economic activity in the U.S. Woo (2003) studied the credit slowdown in Japan in 1997 
and concluded that the pervasive shortage of bank capital was the reason behind it. Using data for 107 countries, 
Barth et al. (2006) for instance, documented that while banks facing more stringent capital regulations have fewer 
nonperforming loans, the link between capital stringency and banking crises is not robust. Using data from Italian 
banks in 1992-2001, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) showed that well capitalized banks can better absorb 
temporary financial difficulties on the part of their borrowers and preserve long term lending relationships. Better 
capitalized banks can also better shield their lending from monetary shocks as they have easier access to non 
insured funding. Indeed, loan growth of highly leveraged banks is more responsive to monetary policy than the 
loan growth of well capitalized banks (Kishan & Opiela, 2000). Thus, the negative impact of higher short term 
interest rates on credit availability is stronger for banks with lower capital. Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) used 
Italian data for 2007-2009 and found evidence of a contraction of credit supply associated with low bank 
capitalization. Using US data, Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) found a positive relationship between bank 
leverage and equity risk. De Jonghe (2010) measured banks‟ systemic risk exposures using extreme value theory. 
The result showed that higher capital reduces banks‟ exposure to systemic risk. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2011) who employed data for over 3000 banks in 86 countries, reported that capital regulation is not robustly 
associated with bank risk measured by individual bank Z-scores. All studies referred to above suggest that higher 
capital makes the provision of credit more stable and robust even in economic downturns. More capital also allows 
banks to better withstand financial and real shocks. Bank capital increases the capacity to raise non insured debt 
and thus banks‟ ability to limit the effect of a drop in deposits on lending. Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) framework, Miles, Jing, and Gilberto (2012) estimated the relationship between leverage and equity beta. 
The study reports that higher capital reduces the chance of banking crises. Small firms become more credit 
constrained when banks are under pressure to satisfy capital requirements. This has been documented by Popov 
and Udell (2012). They studied the sensitivity of credit supply to banks‟ financial conditions in 16 emerging 
European countries before and during the recent financial crisis and results suggested that the effect of positive and 
negative shocks to a bank on its lending is greater for riskier firms and firms with fewer tangible assets. Another 
type of lending those banks cut when being capital constrained is loans to the real estate sector. De Haan and 
Klomp (2012) used data on 200 banks in 21 OECD countries and applied factor analysis on 25 indicators of banking 
risk, the study reported that capital regulation reduces capital and asset risk of banks. Based on  a 40 years data 
from the United States, Baker and Wurgler (2013) confirmed that better capitalized banks have both lower 
systematic risk (beta) and lower idiosyncratic risk. Another line of research examined the impact of capital 
requirements on bank risk taking. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) employed a sample of more than 800 banks from 55 
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countries during 2006-2010 and the result showed that bank capital played a cushioning role. Better capitalized 
banks (with lower leverage ratio) that when exposed to the financial market shocks decreased their supply of loans 
less than other banks. 
Using data for German banks covering the period 1965-2009, Buch and Prieto (2014) found that a long run 
increase in bank capital of one percent increased bank loans by 0.23%. Interestingly, bank loans decreased with 
bank capital only when the capital to asset ratio is above 33%. Also, during the recent financial crisis, banks with 
strong balance sheets were better able to maintain their lending. Recent study by Martynova (2015) showed that 
higher bank capital increases the franchise value of core banking activities; this allows banks to attract new funds 
that can be used for investment in risky market based activities.  De Haan. and Klomp (2015) found similar results 
for a sample of emerging and developing countries. However, some  other studies in this line of research, report 
that there is not a strong relationship between capital requirements and bank risk. Using Spanish Credit Register 
data on all monthly information requests lodged by banks on borrowers, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina 
(2012) showed that a one percent increase in the interest rate decreases loans granted by less capitalized banks by 
3.9 percent more than loans granted by well capitalized banks. As a result, higher bank capital is important in 
reducing banks‟ financial fragility as well as their ability to survive financial crises. (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; 
Diamond. & Rajan, 2001). In a sample of banks from advanced and emerging economies, the latter study found that 
higher pre crisis capital improved bank performance during the 2008 crisis. Similarly, Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
showed that higher capital in US banks enabled them to improve their market shares during banking crises, and 
these banks are generally able to maintain their improved shares afterwards (although the results are less robust 
for the 2008 crisis). Since higher capital reduces bank risk and creates a buffer against losses, it makes funding with 
non insured debt less information sensitive. (Admati et al., 2010). This decreases the possibility of bank runs 
enhancing financial stability (Admati et al., 2010; Diamond & Rajan, 2000). However, studies that focus on banks in 
advanced economies during the 2008 crisis alone often come to different conclusions. Thus, using OECD data 
(Huang & Ratnovski, 2009) found no relationship between pre crisis bank capital and performance during the crisis. 
For their sample of European banks, Camara, Laetitia, and Amine (2010) reported  that well capitalized banks took 
more risk before the 2008 crisis. Using a sample of 36 major global banks, the IMF‟s GFSR 2009 found that banks 
that received government support during the crisis had statistically higher capital metrics before the crisis. The 
BCBS [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] (1999) surveyed the evidence for the response of banks in the G-
10 countries to the introduction of the 1988 capital requirements, concluding that bank capital pressures during 
cyclical downturns in the US and Japan may have limited bank lending in those periods and contributed to the 
economic weakness in some macroeconomic sectors. Using panel data on large US commercial banks between 1989 
and 1997, Furfine (2000) developed a structural dynamic model. The simulations predicted that a one percentage 
point increase in risk based capital requirement resulted in 5.5% reduction in loan growth. Albertazzi and 
Marchetti (2010) using Italian data after the Lehman collapse, documented two percentage points higher 
contraction of credit supply by less capitalized banks than well capitalized ones. The study also highlighted that 
borrowers had a limited ability to find substitute funding. Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011) studied the effect of the 
financial crisis on the lending of German banks. The study concluded that banks hit by the crisis reject 11% more 
loan applications than non affected banks. 
Several studies estimated the effect of increased capital requirement on bank lending using UK data for the 
1990s-2000s. Thus, Francis and Osborne (2012) modeled the targeted capital ratios; based on those numbers they 
computed capital shortfalls which are further used to explain credit growth. The authors found that a one 
percentage point increase in capital requirements would reduce lending in 2002 by 1.2%. Using data for the UK 
banks subject to time varying capital requirements in 1998-2007, Aiyar, Charles, and Tomasz (2014b) exploited a 
single equation approach and showed that a one percentage point rise in capital requirement reduces credit growth 
by 6.5-7.2 percentage points. Aiyar., Charles, and Tomasz (2014c) used a Bayesian hierarchical approach to 
estimate panel VAR models and found that an increase in capital requirements by one percentage point reduces the 
growth rate in real lending by 4.6 percentage points. Bridges et al. (2014) focusing on the effect of capital 
requirement on sectoral lending, provided an estimate for the reduction in total lending of 3.5% in response to a 
one percentage point increase in capital requirement. Aiyar, Charles, John, Yevgeniya, and Tomasz (2014a) using 
data of 1999-2006 found that higher capital requirements reduce cross border lending as a one percentage point 
increase in capital requirements is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross border credit of 5.5 
percentage points.  
Another UK study by Noss and Toffano (2014) estimated how an increase in macroprudential capital 
requirements might affect banks‟ lending in the face of a credit boom. They provided an upper bound estimate of 
4.5% reduction in lending associated with a one percentage point increase in risk weighted capital requirement. 
Following the approach of Francis and Osborne (2012) and using the data from 15 countries, BIS MAG 
(Macroeconomic Assessment Group) (2010) estimated that a one percentage point increase in capital requirement 
causes a decline of 1.4% in the volume of lending. 
Brun et al. (2013) estimated the macroeconomic effect of the transition from Basel I to Basel II based regulation 
in France. The study showed that a two percentage points increase in capital requirements led to an increase in 
aggregate corporate lending by 1.5%, a rise in aggregate investment by 0.5% and creation or preservation of 
235,000 jobs. Thus, most empirical evidence suggested that increase in capital requirements by one percentage 
point force banks to cut their total lending in the short run by 1.2-4.5% or reduced credit growth by 1.2-4.6 
percentage points. 
Mesonnier and Monks (2014) used the recapitalization exercise of 2011-2012 by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). The EBA announcement was unexpected and required banks to have higher capital ratios than 
foreseen in transition to Basel III. Exploiting data for 250 large banks in the euro area, they found that forcing a 
banking group to increase its Core Tier 1 ratio by one percentage point was associated with a reduction in this 
group‟s credit growth by 1.2 percentage points. Similarly, Bridges et al. (2014) reported that UK banks faced with a 
one percentage point increase in  capital requirements reduced commercial real estate loan growth by 8 percentage 
points within one year after the change in capital regulation. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The data used for this study was secondary in nature and a time series data obtained from the publications of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin 2019 and Nigeria stock exchange fact sheet. Data were collected for 
the period of 1986 to 2019 on bank credits to the private sector (CPS) and credit to small and medium enterprises 
(CSM) as proxies for banks lending behavior.  
 
3.2. Estimation Techniques 
The study used the descriptive statistic and econometric in its analysis. The descriptive statistic analysis was 
carried out to ascertain the behavior of the variables of study utilizing such measures as the mean, median, standard 
deviations, skewness and kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera statistic. Furthermore, the study used graphical analytical 
techniques such as line graphs, histogram and stacked bar charts, among others while for the econometric analysis 
the unit root test was used to investigate the stationarity of the variables as a non stationarity could lead to 
spurious regression results. However, the ARDL model was be adopted as the estimation technique of the study, 
while the Granger Causality Test was also applied in checking the underlying structure of the dynamic relationship 
between the variables. 
 
3.3. Model Specification  
Following the previous works of Pesaran and Shin (1996); Canta (2011) and Aliero, Abdullahi, and Adamu 
(2013) the study assumed that the Basel Capital Channel and Lending Behavior of Banking Institutions in Nigeria: 
An Empirical investigation can be modeled using two sets of models as follows: 
     (                 )                               Eq. (1) 
To have the estimable version of above equation, Equation 1 can be rewritten to have: 
                                                Eq. (2) 
Where: CPS = Credit to Private Sector 
BASi    = Basel I Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2). 
BASii   = Basel II Capital (Total capital requirement). 
BASiii = Basel III Capital Conservation Buffer (CSB) + Counter-Cyclical Buffer (CCB) 
       U = Error term 
     (                 )                                Eq. (3) 
We can rewrite Equation 3 to have: 
                                                 Eq.  (4) 
 
Where:  
CSM = Credit to Small and Medium Enterprises 
BASi    = Basel I Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2). 
BASii   = Basel II Capital (Total capital requirement). 
BASiii = Basel III Capital Conservation Buffer (CSB) + Counter-Cyclical Buffer (CCB). 
U = Error term 
 
4. Data Analysis  
4.1. Trends of Basel Capital and Macroeconomic Variables 
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Figure-1. Basel I Capital. 
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Figure-2. Basel II Capital. 
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Figure-3. Basel III Capital. 
                                  
The Basel Capital trend analyses are found in Figure 1, 2 and 3 above. Basel I capital ratios in Nigeria showed a 
rising trend in terms of credit risk provisions. Basel II ratios showed a constant trend without any improvement in 
the absorption of credit, market and operational risks. However, Basel III capital showed a declining trend, 
explained by declining provisions in conservation and pro-cyclical buffers. 
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Figure-4. Credits to private sector. 
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Figure-5. Credits to small and medium enterprises. 
                               
The trends in bank lending behaviors are summarized in Figure 4 and 5 above. The growth in credit to the 
private sector showed a rising trend with a remarkable peak in 2008, and trough in 2019. Growth of credit to the 
SMEs sector showed a remarkable downward trend. 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistic 
 
Table-1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable CPS SME BASE I BASE II BASE III 
Mean 12.61290 5.336129 9.387097 5.677419 8.870968 
Median 11.10000 0.850000 10.00000 6.000000 9.000000 
Maximum 36.90000 27.04000 11.00000 7.000000 27.00000 
Minimum -2.400000 0.000000 7.000000 4.000000 4.000000 
Std. Dev. 7.314084 7.155078 1.202149 0.747757 4.318502 
Skewness 1.301863 1.268652 -1.251100 0.103223 2.697124 
Kurtosis 5.815111 3.864529 2.962837 2.515799 11.57840 
Jarque-Bera 18.99297 9.281046 8.088911 0.357883 132.6373 
Probability 0.000075 0.009653 0.017519 0.836155 0.000000 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 
Note:  
CPS       = Credit to Private Sector. 
SME      = Small and Medium Enterprises. 
         =   Basel I Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2). 
         =   Basel II Capital (Total Minimum Capital). 
         =   Basel III Capital (Conservation Buffer (CSB) + Counter-Cyclical Buffer (CCB)). 
 
The results in Table 1 showed mean values of 9.38%, 5.68% and 8.87% for Basel I, II, and III for the period 
under study. The gap between the maximum and minimum values is widest in terms of Basel III (27.0 and 4.0). In 
addition, the provisions under Basel III offer wider absolute variations with a standard deviation of 4.32%. With a 
mean average of 12.61% and 5.34%, it is observed that growth in credit to the private sector and SMEs experienced 
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the widest swing with a standard deviation of 7.31% and 7.16%. The distributions of Basel capital and variables of 
lending bahaviors are not normal with evident of asymmetrical skewness, leptokurtic kurtosis and flat tails. This is 
confirmed by the Jarque-Bera statistics and associated probabilities. 
 
4.3. Econometric Analyses  
4.3.1. Unit Root Test 
 
Table-2. Unit root test for Basel measures.  
Variable D(BASi) D(BASii) D(BASiii) 
ADF Statistics -7.587722 -6.903685 -6.284499 
1% -3.679322 -3.679322 -3.679322 
5% -2.967767 -2.967767 -2.967767 
10% -2.622989 -2.622989 -2.622989 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
. 
 
The study conducted stationary test for the Basel capital channel variables using the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) unit root test. The results are summarized and presented in Table 2 for each of the variables studied. From 
the above table it is obvious that the three variables were non stationary at levels but appears stationary at first 
difference. Hence, the series are all integrated of order 1(1). This is evidenced by the fact that the absolute values of 
the ADF test statistics are all greater than the MacKinnon critical values at 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance and 
thus the respective null hypotheses of non-stationary are rejected, implying the absence of unit root among the 
variables. 
 
Table-3. Unit root test for selected macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. 
Variable D(CPS) D(SME) D(RGDP) D(FDI1) D(FDI11) 
ADF Statistics -3.742833 -6.747184 -7.494608 -3.997403 -3.820481 
1% -3.679322 -3.679322 -3.679322 -3.679322 -3.679322 
5% -2.967769 -2.967767 -2.967767 -2.967767 -2.967767 
10% -2.622989 -2.622989 -2.622989 -2.622989 -2.622989 
Probability 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0071 
 
 
The study conducted stationary test for the selected macroeconomic variables using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) unit root test. The results are summarized and presented in Table 3 for each of the variables studied. 
From the above table it is obvious that all the selected macroeconomic variables were non stationary at levels but 
appears stationary at first difference. Hence, the series are all integrated of order 1(1). This is evidenced by the fact 
that the absolute values of the ADF test statistics are all greater than the MacKinnon critical values at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level significance and thus the respective null hypotheses of non-stationary are rejected, implying the absence 
of unit root among the variables. 
 
4.4. Relationship between Basel Capital and Bank Lending Behavior 
 
Table-4. Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) results for Basel capital and CPS. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.* 
CPS(-1) 0.478330 0.351294 1.361621 0.2006 
CPS(-2) -0.417282 0.492191 -0.847805 0.4146 
CPS(-3) -0.036859 0.509674 -0.072319 0.9436 
CPS(-4) 0.898983 0.473097 1.900208 0.0839 
BASi 0.104338 1.488245 0.070108 0.9454 
BASii 3.548238 1.753683 2.023306 0.0080 
BASii(-1) 3.609792 3.081279 1.171524 0.0261 
BASii(-2) -6.290792 1.931521 -3.256912 0.0076 
BASii(-3) 0.618392 2.611562 0.236790 0.8172 
BASii(-4) 3.136528 2.311307 1.357036 0.2020 
BASiii -0.984963 0.339355 -2.902456 0.0144 
BASiii(-1) -0.787566 0.456055 -1.726910 0.1121 
BASiii(-2) -0.442777 0.253565 -1.746204 0.1086 
BASiii(-3) -0.724596 0.311443 -2.326576 0.0401 
BASiii(-4) -1.217085 0.304761 -3.993579 0.0021 
C 11.60274 12.00310 0.966646 0.3545 
R-squared 0.893054 Mean dependent var 12.97778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.747219 S.D. dependent var 7.771859 
S.E. of regression 3.907481 Akaike info criterion 5.850907 
Sum squared resid 167.9525 Schwarz criterion 6.618810 
Log likelihood -62.98724 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.079245 
F-statistic 6.123729 Durbin-Watson stat 1.889550 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002206    
Note: *p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection. 
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The ARDL results in Table 4 above captured model 1 of this study. Both the global statistic and the diagnostic 
test indicated that the utility, forecasting and predictive power of the model as specified was very high. We can 
thus rely on the relative results to make inferences on the relationship between the variables under study. A 
cursory look at Table 4 above showed that Basel I capital (BASi) is positively related to growth in credit to the 
private sector (CPS) at a coefficient of 0.1043 but statistically insignificant at 5% level of significance at a 
probability of 0.9454. This means that 1.1 increments in the provision of Basel I capital will lead to 12.1043 
increases in CPS. On the other hand, Basel II capital (BASii) related positively with the growth in credit to the 
private sector though not significant in the current period at 5% level. This is demonstrated with the coefficient of 
3.5482 at a probability of 0.0080. Though this is significant at 10%, but not accepted as our significance level. 
However, it turned negative and statistically significant at 5% with a coefficient of -6.2908 and probability of 
0.0076 when lagged in the second period. Also Basel III capital (BASiii) is statistically significant at 5% level but 
with a negative probability and coefficient of (-0.9850 and 0.0144) for the current period, (-0.7246 and 0.0401) for 
the third period and -1.2171 and 0.0021 for the fourth period respectively when lagged. In addition, the coefficient 
of determination (R2) of 0.89 in Table 4 shows that 89 percent of variation in growth of credit to the private sector 
is explained by changes in Basel capital. This relationship is significant at the 5% level since the F-statistic of 
6.1237 falls outside the critical region of         Hence we reject the HO1, and accept the alternate. 
 
Table-5. Pairwise granger causality tests for Basel capital and CPS. 
 Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 BASi does not Granger Cause CPS  29 0.28778 0.7525 
 CPS does not Granger Cause BAsi 0.43405 0.6529 
 BASii does not Granger Cause CPS  29 1.06422 0.0007 
 CPS does not Granger Cause BASii 0.21290 0.8097 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause CPS  29 0.10279 0.9027 
 CPS does not Granger Cause BASiii 0.12265 0.8851 
 BASii does not Granger Cause BASi  29 0.57833 0.5685 
 BASi does not Granger Cause BASii 0.93912 0.4049 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause BASi  29 0.08027 0.9231 
 BASi does not Granger Cause BASiii 0.70820 0.5025 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause BASii  29 0.86320 0.4345 
 BASii does not Granger Cause BASiii 1.05049 0.3653 
 
The results in Table 5 shows that a F-statistics of 0.2878 and 0.1028 at 5% level of significance,  for Basel I 
(BASi) and (0.2878 and 0.1028) for Basel III (BASiii) capital. Similarly they recorded a probability of 0.7525 and 
0.9027 for both Basel I and III. This is indication that Basel I and Basel III capital does not cause growth in credit 
to the private sector (CPS) as there probability is above the stipulated 5% significance level. However, it was also 
observed from results that causality runs unidirectional from Basel II capital (BASii) to growth in credit to the 
private sector as shown by the F-statistic and probability of 1.0642 and 0.0007 respectively. This implied that an 
enhancement in Basel II capital (BASii) will trigger up growth in credit to private sector. Further, it suggested that 
as banks continue to comply with the provision of Basel II capital, growth in credit to the private sector will be 
raised as well. 
 
Table-6. Autoregressive distributed lag results for basel capital and credit to SMEs. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.* 
SME 0.943866 0.168145 5.613400 0.0000 
BASi -4.604238 1.572343 -2.928266 0.0076 
BASi(-1) 3.358290 1.605479 2.091768 0.0477 
BASii 2.321630 1.728992 1.342765 0.0192 
BASii(-1) -3.440260 1.627584 -2.113722 0.0456 
BASiii -0.068078 0.206255 -0.330067 0.7443 
C 19.31019 9.335211 2.068533 0.0500 
R-squared 0.682227 Mean dependent var 5.514000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.599330 S.D. dependent var 7.207350 
S.E. of regression 4.562145 Akaike info criterion 6.074426 
Sum squared resid 478.7029 Schwarz criterion 6.401373 
Log likelihood -84.11640 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.179019 
F-statistic 8.229790 Durbin-Watson stat 1.963761 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000080  
Note: *p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model selection. 
 
The ARDL results in Table 6 above, the global statistics and the diagnostic test (DWT) indicated that the 
utility, forecasting and predictive power of the model as specified was at 0.68 percent. Based on the ARDL results, 
we can rely on the relative and global statistics results to make inferences on the relationship between the variables 
under study. Taking a keen look at Table 6 it shows that Basel I capital (BASi) is negatively related and 
statistically significant to growth in credits to SMEs at a coefficient of 4.6042 and probability of 0.0076. 
Furthermore, Basel I lagged in period 1 with a coefficient and probability of 3.3583 and 0.0477 is an indication that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between Basel I capital and growth in credit to SMEs. On the other 
hand, Basel II capital (BASii) relates positively but statistically significant at 5% level. This is confirmed by the 
Basel II coefficient of 2.3216 and probability of 0.0192. However, Basel II capital lagged in period 1 turned a 
negative relationship with a coefficient of -3.4402 but significant with a probability of 0.0456. This means that 
there is an inverse relationship between Basel II capital and growth in credit to SMEs. Basel III capital (BASiii) 
records a beta coefficient of -0.0681 and probability of 0.7443. Going by this, it means that there is a negative 
Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies, 2020, 7(2): 124-134 
132 
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Asian Online Journal Publishing Group 
 
 
relationship between Basel III capital and growth in credit to SMEs which is statistically insignificant at 5% level. 
In addition, the coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.68 in Table 6 shows that 68 percent of variation in growth of 
credit to the private sector is explained by changes in Basel capital. This relationship is significant at the 5% level 
since the F-statistic of 8.2298 falls outside the critical region of 0.0001.  Hence we reject the HO2, and accept the 
alternate. 
 
Table-7. Pairwise granger causality tests. 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 BASi does not Granger Cause SME  29 0.85541 0.4377 
 SME does not Granger Cause BASi 9.09658 0.0011 
 BASii does not Granger Cause SME  29 1.46560 0.0050 
 SME does not Granger Cause BASii 3.04631 0.0062 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause SME  29 0.04181 0.9591 
 SME does not Granger Cause BASiii 0.13677 0.8728 
 BASii does not Granger Cause BASi  29 0.57833 0.5685 
 BASi does not Granger Cause BASii 0.93912 0.4049 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause BASi  29 0.08027 0.9231 
 BASi does not Granger Cause BASiii 0.70820 0.5025 
 BASiii does not Granger Cause BASii  29 0.86320 0.4345 
 BASii does not Granger Cause BASiii 1.05049 0.3653 
                          
The results  in Table 7 shows that at 5% level of significance causality does not flow from Basel I capital (BASi) 
to growth in SMEs, this is confirmed by the F-statistics and probability of (0.8554 and 0.4377). But F-statistics and 
probability shows that causality runs unidirectional from SMEs to Basel I and this is significant at 5%. The F-
statistics (1.4656 and 3.0463) and probability (0.0050 and 0.0062) for Basel II capital (BASii) shows that there exist 
a bi-directional causality between Basel II and SMEs but this is significant at 10%, while for Basel III capital 
(BASiii), the F-statistics of 0.0418 and 0.1368 and the probability of 0.9591 and 0.8728 records that there is no 
causality between Basel III capital (BASiii) and credit to SMEs. Therefore, the hypothesis of there is no causality is 
rejected in place of the alternate. 
 
4.5. Discussion of Findings 
The empirical findings for the study support the theory of bank capital channel that postulate that monetary 
policy actions influence bank lending behavior, through its impact on bank equity capital. These monetary policy 
actions can lead to a change in the financial position of the banking sector, thereby changing the preferences of its 
shareholder (Markovic, 2006).  When bank equity capital is sufficiently low, because of loan losses or some other 
adverse shocks, the bank will reduce lending because of the capital requirement and the cost of issuing new equity. 
Even when the capital requirement is not currently binding, the model showed that a low capitalized bank may 
optimally forgo profitable lending opportunities now to lower the risk of future capital inadequacy. Conversely, the 
empirical results for Nigeria contradicted the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theory that argued that in the world of 
perfect capital markets, bank lending decisions are independent of banks institution capital structure, since the bank 
will always be able to find investors willing to fund viable lending opportunities; the level of bank capital is 
irrelevant to lending and also to the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Hubbard et al., 2006). This theory 
or logic of Modigliani and Miller existed as bank‟s lending depended on its capital structure as well as on lending 
opportunities and market interest rates. When equity is sufficiently low, because of loan losses or some other 
adverse shock, the bank will reduce lending because of the capital requirement is not currently binding, the model 
showed that a low capitalized bank may optimally forgo profitable lending opportunities now to lower the risk of 
future capital inadequacy (Chami & Cosimano, 2001; Meh & Moran, 2010). Previous studies provided evidence on 
the positive relationship between Bank capital and lending behavior and because the studies were all in advanced 
economies, it was essential to study whether the same principles would hold given the dynamics of emerging 
market economies of which Nigeria is one. Empirically, our findings agreed with the works of Berger et al. (1995); 
Peek and Rosengren (1995); Adewumi (1997); Woo (2003), Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010); Buch and Prieto 
(2014);  Koch and MacDonald (2015); Woo (2003), Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010); Klaus and Philipp (2013) and 
Jose, Santiago, Ana, and Camilo (2017) in which they opined that under capitalized banks reduced their lending 
more than the well capitalized and therefore the well capitalized positively influences lending behavior in Nigeria. 
However, this position was contradicted by the works of Kapan and Minoiu (2013) who argued that better 
capitalized banks with lower leverage ratio are exposed to financial market shocks decreased their supply of loans 
less than other banks. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Based on the findings of the study, we conclude that in Nigeria the theory of bank capital channel which 
postulates that monetary policy actions influence bank lending behavior, through its impact on bank equity capital 
is supported. This conclusive position is based on the analysis of the relationship of the variables modeled in the 
study which showed that Basel capital influences growth in credit to the private sector (CPS) and growth in credit 
to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Based on the conclusion, the study therefore recommend as follows: 
i. The Central Bank of Nigeria should focus adequate attention in ensuring macroeconomic and monetary 
stability to enable not only banking business but other businesses to strive in the country/economy. 
ii. The monetary authority as a prudential regulator should monitor the banks compliance to the provisions of 
the Basel capital accords. 
iii. Banks should maintain both conservation buffer (CSB) and counter-cyclical buffer (CCB) with the view to 
absorbing emerging shocks from loan losses. 
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